Empire of Debt: The
Rise of an Epic Financial Crisis, William Bonner and Addison
Wiggin, John Wiley & Sons, 370 pages
by Llewellyn H.
Rockwell Jr.
Two hundred years ago,
when the United States was a modest commercial republic, the
president could take a walk down Pennsylvania Avenue—by
himself—and talk to anyone who approached him. If he wasn’t
on a walk outdoors, he was most likely at home, and you
could speak to him by knocking on the door of the White
House and presenting yourself.
The Hamiltonians and their agenda of
mercantilism, paper money, and presidential exaltation had
been humiliated in the election of 1800. Jeffersonianism had
prevailed against them. And though Jefferson made some
missteps during his presidency—not even Jefferson could be
fully trusted with power—the policy bias was clear:
frugality, free trade, peace, hard money, and decentralized
government.
Today? The president moves about like Caesar
Augustus, with a vast, graded court of civil and military
aides, doctors, secretaries, valets, hairdressers, makeup
artists, bodyguards, drivers, baggage handlers, cooks, food
tasters, Praetorian guards, snipers, centurions, bulletproof
limos, a portable hospital, and an armored rostrum. And
that’s when he travels in the U.S.
When Bush visited Ottawa, members of
Parliament were refused entry into their own legislature by
the massed power of the Secret Service, in violation of
Canadian law. When Bush visited London, 5,000 additional
police were assigned to protect him. Parks and streets and
neighborhoods were closed. Riflemen thronged the roofs. The
queen was horrified by the trashed condition of the grounds
and great rooms of Buckingham Palace, but that meant nothing
relative to the security of the emperor.
He counts far more than any other human
being on earth. So, of course, every event is staged to the
extreme. The president is spoken to by no regular person.
There are as many walls that separate us from him as between
the supposed government of Iraq and its people or the old
Soviet Politburo and the Russian people. These people live
and breathe fear.
The paranoia of the Bush circle has infected
the whole regime. The entire government—elected officials,
appointed staff, permanent bureaucracy—has shifted in the
last decade from pretending to be the people’s servants to
admitting that they regard the people as a threat. Thus do
we see the stream of legislation permitting ever more powers
to spy, confiscate, and jail without trial.
Never has sociologist Franz Oppenheimer’s
view of the state been more clearly on display: it is there
to dominate, exploit, and protect itself against any
challenges to its power. It clings to power like Gollum
holding the ring. And that power is deployed not for the
purpose of protecting people but for protecting the state
and its interests. When Oppenheimer theorized in 1908 that
this was the true nature of the state, he was shouted down
and pilloried for denying the doctrine of government as a
social compact. Now his claims read like a description of
the day’s political news.
Most Americans are aware that something has
gone very wrong, but they are at a loss to sort of out the
causes, especially the ones that are most invisible. This is
where the smashing book by William Bonner and Addison Wiggin,
titled Empire of Debt, performs an extraordinary
service. In addition to being accomplished financial
analysts, Bonner and Wiggin are talented historical writers.
And they put this talent to work in the cause of examining
the political and economic effects of empire.
The authors not only provide a frightening
picture of the mess that the U.S. government has made at
home and abroad, they also understand the crucial role that
the monetary regime has played in this debacle. They show
how the legal right to counterfeit—that’s what the Federal
Reserve grants the government—has changed the structure of
the government and led to the loss of liberty and the rise
of an imperial power unlike any in history.
In the commercial republic of Jefferson,
money was gold and silver. Government had no power to print
currency. It was not even allowed to tax directly. What
money it had came from tariff revenue, and pressure from
exporters and importers kept it low. Even if Jefferson had
wanted to establish a tyranny, there was no means to do so.
If the wall of separation between money and the state was
not as high as it might have been, there was still a barrier
that put a curb on power-mongering.
Today, however, all the money government
could ever want is easily available via a monetary policy
that depends critically on the capacity of the Fed to create
currency out of thin air. The Fed’s printing presses back
every debt note issued by the Fed, and the new currency is
sopped up by foreign central banks and private holdings
around the world, particularly among Asian nations. The
dollar is, for now, the world reserve currency, which
permits the U.S. to sustain a world empire without paying
the price—again, for now.
The critical turning point is one I remember
well. Richard Nixon enacted, by imperial decree, a purely
fiat dollar, repudiating solemn promises to redeem in gold.
After that, with the printing presses running 24/7, the
Pax Americana could be “financed.” To understand the
connection requires that we understand two fields of study
that are usually kept separate: foreign-policy analytics and
monetary economics. It is in understanding this relationship
that our authors excel.
Alan Greenspan had pretended to be against
it all, but given the chance for power, he happily
repudiated his restrictionist gold-standard views and
supplied the credit for the expensive wars, the expensive
bread, and the expensive circuses that have wrecked empires
from Rome to London. His successor promises even more of the
same.
With the end of the last remnants of the
gold standard, “all the restraints, inhibitions, and modesty
of the Old Republic [were] blown away,” note Bonner and
Wiggin. “In their place has emerged a vainglorious system of
conceit, deceit, debt, and delusion,” with special financial
significance for the country and individuals. The authors
note in passing that, for example, the U.S. military could
be cut 75 percent and still give the government the biggest,
most technologically advanced army in the world.
While the loss of gold money was a turning
point, the imperial urge has much deeper roots. It all
started, say the authors, when the balmy Teddy Roosevelt
began riding rough over small, poor nations. They might have
gone back further in time. Robert E. Lee, writing Lord
Acton, feared that the federal victory over the South would
mean despotism at home and empire abroad. It wasn’t too many
years later when the religious maniac McKinley launched an
attack on Spain, seizing colonies in grand fashion and
murdering any natives who objected. Or we might even look
back further. The hardcore might even see the United States’
imperial career beginning with its conquest and colonization
of northern Mexico. Maybe its roots are in the Colonial era
with New England’s religio-cultural drive to improve and
perfect the world through coercion and belligerence.
Regardless of the roots, the modern history
is undeniably disgraceful. In the midst of my favorite
chapter, “Woodrow Crosses the Rubicon,” the authors pause to
repudiate the great killer-presidents and to praise instead
men like Warren G. Harding. He was pro-peace, and he
pardoned the antiwar hero Eugene Debs, who had been jailed
and his health destroyed by Wilson for criticizing
conscription. Further, they note that there is no Harding
Law, no Harding Building in D.C., no war he started, and no
government program he launched.
“Remember,” Wilson had proclaimed, “that God
ordained that I should be the next president of the United
States.” How many Americans know that Wilson invaded Mexico
before Europe, raising the federal war banner over Veracruz,
and set off a reign of terror at home in which Germans, or
those thought to be German, were lynched and those who
dissented from his national socialism were jailed?
Wilson also established the Federal Reserve,
the income-tax police, and the direct election of senators.
The latter wiped out an original buttress to states’ rights
and led to more and more centralization, as senators saw
themselves as representatives of D.C. to their states rather
than of the state legislatures to the central government.
Frank Chodorov called it “The Revolution of 1913.”
The Federal Reserve’s monetary manipulations
to finance World War I, and then the boom of the 1920s, led
to the Great Depression and then the Roosevelt revolution
towards massive statism. After it and Trumanism and Modern
Republicanism, Americans live, said John T. Flynn, “in the
war-torn, debt-ridden, tax-harried wreckage of a once
imposing edifice of the free society which rose out of the
American Revolution on the foundation of the U.S.
Constitution.”
The impulse to empire helps make sense out
of our huge deficits and debts or such costly and obvious
blunders as the invasion of Iraq or the war on terror. It is
as if America were committing suicide, our authors say,
first by bankrupting the economy and then by creating
endless enemies all over the world.
With this comes a belligerent and blind
nationalism that has affected the whole culture in one
degree or another. But then, in an empire, the people must
become “hollow dummies,” said Orwell. They must believe they
are superior to others, and have a right to tell others what
to do. Americans seem to go beyond even this. They believe
that other countries actually want to be invaded and
occupied and shaped into mini-Americas by the United States.
All we have to do is “get their dictators off their backs,
and the men will start building shopping malls and the women
dressing like Britney Spears.”
Did the Swiss puzzle and plot over what kind
of government the Iraqis should have? Did they set out to
make the rest of the world more like Switzerland and think
that other peoples secretly yearned to be Swiss themselves?
No, these are imperial inanities.
Paying tribute to As We Go Marching,
John T. Flynn’s great analysis of New Deal fascism, our
authors understand the glorification of militarism and war
that lies at the heart of right-wing statism. As Flynn
quoted an Italian fascist, today’s red-state fascists also
see the mass death and destruction of war as “the great
anvil of fire and blood on which strong peoples are
hammered.”
Once upon a time France had a great empire.
Frenchmen thought they had the best language, the best
culture, the best government, the best economy, the best
schools, the best builders, the best army. And it was their
duty to civilize the globe. Now, after French imperial
bankruptcy and the destruction of the franc, we have the
mission civilisatrice to spread freedom and democracy.
Or so the president informs us.
But then, no one’s business is too small or
too remote to be of no interest to the U.S. state. From its
globe-girdling military bases and its world-circling spy
satellites, the U.S. watches everything, everywhere, always.
Not a sparrow falls without “triggering a monitoring device
in the Pentagon.”
Yet citizens of the empire exult, just as in
Rome:
The average American reacted just as the
average Roman had reacted. When the purple was hoisted, he
stood up and saluted. It made him feel like a big shot. If
Americans were bossing people around in Asia or the Middle
East, it made him feel more important. His homeland team
was winning all over the world. And if it did not always
seem to be on the winning side, he knew he must support
his troops and stand behind their commander-in-chief. No
one wants to carp and criticize when soldiers take the
field. It is unpatriotic. So, keep the soldiers in the
field all the time.
American business is still heroically
capitalistic, entrepreneurs brilliant and brave at
creatively serving the needs of the people, though hogtied
by the vastest government in history. On top of that, every
aspect of the economy is distorted by the expansionary
policies of the Federal Reserve, resulting—in just one
instance—in a huge housing bubble.
Thanks to the incentives created by the
welfare state and the Fed, Americans tend to consume more
than they earn. Stocks today trade for about 20 times
earnings, whereas the norm is 12-15 times. House prices
usually increase at the rate of inflation, not 10 times as
fast. A global power monopoly is also abnormal. At some
point, all the myths cherished by the imperial people, say
our authors, must go to “humbug heaven.”
After all, the long-term mean value of paper
currency is zero. Is the dollar magic, so that it is
permanently immune from the norm? For the last 100 years, it
has lost value more quickly than the Roman denarius after
Nero. No surprise, since it is much easier to create
unlimited numbers of dollars than to mint coins with at
least some silver or gold in them. On the other hand, by the
time of the last emperor, the denarius—which started as pure
silver—had .02 percent precious metal content. That is, the
denarius had lost, over hundreds of years, 99.98 percent of
its value. Since the founding of the Fed in 1913, the dollar
has lost 95 percent.
Something else that will revert to the norm:
wages. There is no inherent reason that a plumber with a
U.S. flag pin should earn more than one with a crescent
moon. In India, real incomes have doubled in the last 10
years. In the U.S. they have been stagnant or worse. The
inequitable draining of the world’s resources into America,
made possible by the military empire and its financial
structure since Bretton Woods, is also coming to an end.
The authors call themselves conservatives,
but they quote Confessions of an Economic Hitman
approvingly and see through the Cold War humbug about the
Communist Conspiracy, the terrorism of the previous scam.
Nor do they fall for the mythology that surrounds the
big-spender Reagan nor celebrate the murderous Vietnam War,
with 57,000 dead Americans and between 2 and 3 million dead
Vietnamese. Those names aren’t on a wall, of course.
The book is chock-full of great monetary and
financial charts, though my favorite is a list of all the
known empires and their duration. Not that they believe that
charts tell the future. Indeed, our authors are contrarians.
When most people, they think, are convinced that stocks will
never go up, chances are they will. When most people think
stocks can never fall, chances are they will. If most people
couldn’t be brought to the view that houses will never
decline in value, a rip-roaring housing bubble would be
impossible.
Since the days of the Great Khan, and the
barbaric clarity of his claim that the gods had given him
the earth and everyone and everything in it, empires have
resorted to rosier delusions, if no less fatal to
victims—and sometimes citizens—than the Khan model. From the
Romans to the Fourth Crusade (and their Venetian and French
aggressors) to Genghis Khan to the Spaniards and Napoleon
and the British, Bonner and Wiggin teach us the lessons of
empire, with learning, wisdom, and irony.
“A great empire,” they note,” is to the
world of geopolitics what a great bubble is to the world of
economics. It’s attractive at the outset but a catastrophe
eventually. We know of no exceptions.”
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